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STATE OF UTAH, in the 
Rae Lynn Jones 
Robert William Jones 
James Robert Jones 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
interest of ) 
(12/28/71) ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
(07/27/74) 
(02/07/76) ) Case No. 18189 
Persons Under 18 Years of Age ) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
ON APPEAL 
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Second District 
Juve n i 1 e Co u r t i n and for Sa 1 t Lake County , St a t e of Utah , the 
Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, presiding, on Respondent's petition for 
termination of parental rights of Appellant. All parental rights of 
the above-named children's natural mother, Vina Rae (Jones) 
Patereau, Appellant, were terminated pursuant to the provisions of 
UCA Section 78-3A-48(l)(b). Legal custody and guardianship of t~e 
children were vested in the L.D.S. Social Services for placement in 
a s u i tab 1 e ado p t i v e home • The Court found that the mother had 
abandoned the children in that her conduct evidenced a conscious 
disregard for her parental obligations and that this disregard led 
to the destruction of the parent-child relationship. 
-1-
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DISPOSTION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Second District Juvenile Court, after trial, entered an 
Order permanently terminating all parental rights of the natural 
mother, Vina Rae (Jones) Patereau, Appellant, because her conduct 
indicated that she had abandoned the children. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Juvenile Court 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant, Vina Rae (Jones) Patereau, is the natural 
mother of Rae Lynn Jones, born December 28, 1971; Robert William 
Jones, born July 27, 1974; and James Robert Jones, born February 7, 
1976 (hereinafter "children"). 
The Respondent, James Robert Jones, hereinafter "Mr. 
Jones " , i s t he f a t her o f t he ch i 1 d r en . The App e 1 1 an t and Mr . Jones 
were married, but became separated in April of 1977. (R. 2.). The 
-2-
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Appellant took the children with her upon her separation from Mr. 
Jones, but, due to her graveyard work schedule, was unable to 
arrange for care of the children. She returned the children to Mr. 
Jones for his care until she could care for the children. (R. 17.). 
On Apr i 1 30th, 1978, Appellant and Mr. Jones were 
d i v or c e d . ( R • 2 9 • ) I n t he Dec r e e of Di v or c e Mr • Jones was a wa rd e d 
legal custody of the children, and Appellant was ordered to pay $15 
per month per child for the support of the children. (R. 5.). The 
children have been in the physical custody of Mr. Jones since April, 
1977, until he relinquished custody of the children to the 
Respondent L.D.S. Social Services in December, 1980. (R. 8. - 9.). 
While the children were in the custody of Mr. Jones, the 
Appellant paid no child support for the children. (R. 5.). During 
this time, however, Appellant was either unemployed and receiving 
public assistance or 
part-time work and 
church aid, or was earning minimal wages for 
could not contribute to the support of the 
ch i 1 d r en • ( R . 2 7 • , 3 6 • ) . Neve r t he 1 e s s , App e 11 an t p u r ch as e d t o y s 
and clothing for the children (R. 27.). She sought visitation with 
the children through Mr. Jones or his contacts each month, but was 
refused most requests for visitation until she paid child support 
(R. 18., 19., 25. - 26., 31., 40., 43.). Appellant was allowed 
visitation only four or five times since her separation from Mr. 
Jones, the most recent occasion being in February of 1980, for the 
weekend. (R. 9 - 10.). Appellant's contact with the children was 
further frustrated by Mr. Jones' change of residences and his 
failure to attempt to inform Appellant of such changes. (R. 3. -
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4., 11.). Appellant had told Mr. Jones where she could be reached, 
and she is listed in the Salt Lake Area telephone book. (R. 19., 
23. - 24.). 
In June, 1981, Mr. Jones met with Appellant at Appellant's 
suggestion, to discuss foster care for the children, but Mr. Jones 
did not inform Appellant of his plans to place the children in 
foster care for later adoption. (R. 12. - 15., 20. - 22., 39., 
42.). Appe 11 ant 1 earned of this subsequent placement through the 
newspaper, and irnnediately contacted Respondent L.D.S. Social 
Services. (R. 54.). Mr. Jones filed a Petition for Termination of 
Parental Rights of the Appellant with the Juvenile Court, which 
court ordered Appellant's parental rights in the children terminated 
due to her abandonment of the children. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT 
APPELLANT HAS ABANDONED HER CHILDREN AND THE CONCLUSION THAT HER 
PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE TERMINATED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 
78-3A-48(l)(B), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
This Court has made clear that a strong presumption exists 
against the termination of parental rights. Perhaps the most cogent 
-4-
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statement of the Court's position in this regard was made in the 
recent case of In Re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 (Utah 1981) where the 
court stated: 
•• we have no reservation in agreeing that 
a child is not a mere pawn of the state to be 
dealt with solely on the basis of what public 
officials, or even the courts, may believe to 
be in a child's best interest, without giving 
serious consideration to the rights of the 
natural parent in his child. High among the 
ideals of individual liberty which we consider 
essential in our free society are those which 
protect the sanctity of one's home and family • 
• we are not aware that this court has 
ever espoused the view and it is not our view, 
that the termination of parental rights can be 
decreed without giving serious consideration 
to the prior and fundamental right of a parent 
to rear his child; and concomitantly, of the 
right of the child to be reared by his natural 
parent. It is a matter of such common 
knowledge as to hardly require expression that 
it is in accordance with the natural customs 
and instincts of mankind that in most 
instances the interests of a child are best 
served by being in the custody of natural 
parents. At 856. 
I t i s w i th in these parameter s and upon th i s 
presumption that consideration for Appellant's parental rights 
must be given great weight, for termination of parental rights 
is viewed as a "drastic" remedy which should be resorted to 
only when absolutely necessary and in the interest of a 
child. As the Court stated in State in the Interest of Walter 
!!.:._, 557 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1978), "The severing of family ties is 
a step of utmost gravity both socially and economically." See 
also: State in Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976); 
-5-
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S ta t e v · Lance , 2 3 Utah 2 d 4 O 7 , 4 6 4 p • 2 d 3 9 5 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; St a t e i n 
Interest of E. and B. v. J.T. 578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978). 
It has been consistently held by this Court that to sustain 
an order of the Juvenile Court terminating the parent-child 
relationship, the Court must be convinced by the evidence that the 
conduct of the parent is seriously detrimental in its effect on the 
child. See S ta t e i n the I n t e r e s t o f Mu 11 en , 2 9 U t ah 2 d 3 7 6 , 5 1 O 
P.2d 531 (1973). The Court has held that inasmuch as the 
presumption against termination of parental rights is one based in 
logic, the presumption has "evidentiary value which must be 
considered by the trier of fact in determining the question of 
termination." 
(Utah 1976). 
State in Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311, 1313 
Unquestionably, the Juvenile Court is the finder of 
f a c t i n ca s es i n v o 1 v i n g t e rm i n a ti on o f pa r en ta 1 r i g h t s , but t he 
Supreme Court has made clear that where there is a definite showing 
of abuse of discretion the findings of the Juvenile Court will be 
overturned. , et. al., 576 P.2d 
~--~----------------------------------------
State in Interest of S J 
1280 (Utah 1978). 
In the case at Bar, Appellant's parental rights were 
terminated pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-3A-48(1)(b) Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which provides that: 
1. The court may decree a termination of all 
parental rights with respect to one or both 
parents if the court finds that the parent or 
parents have abandoned the child. It shall be 
prima facie evidence of abandonment that the 
parent or parents, although having legal custody 
of the child, have surrendered physical custody 
of t he ch i 1 d , and for a p e r i o d o f s i x mo n th s 
following such surrender have not manifested to 
the child or to the person having physical 
-6-
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custody of the child a firm intention to resume 
physical custody or to make arrangements for the 
care of the child. 
Where a parent does not have legal custody of a child, 
however, the determination of abandonment must be made solely on the 
facts of the particular case, and no prima facie presumptions apply. 
In Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), a 
mother opposed the adoption of her chi 1 dren by her former husband 
and his new spouse, and as a result the husband brought an action to 
terminate the parental rights of the mother. This Court upheld the 
decision of the lower court which denied the termination, despite 
the fa c t that the mo the r had had no cont a c t w i t h the ch i 1 d r en for 
a pp r ox i ma t e 1 y f i v e ye a r s . Because the mother had never expressed 
any sentiment or conducted herself in any way indicative of a desire 
to abandon the children, the Court held that her rights could not be 
terminated. Spec if i ca 11 y , the Co u r t po i n t e d out that the mo the r 
lacked resources to visit the children. Nonetheless, she did 
at temp t to cont a c t the ch i 1 d re n • Des p i t e a f iv e ye a r 1 a ck of 
conmunication between mother and children, a span of time not even 
closely approximated in Appe 11 ant's case, this Court refused to 
terminate the mother's parental rights and stated that: 
Arising out of the natural bonds of affection and concern 
which natural parents usually have for their children, it 
is and should be the policy of the law to support and give 
strength to the family by encouraging the preservation of 
the parent-child relationship and by being reluctant to 
interfere with or destroy it. Accordingly, the Court does 
not easily find such abandonment, but will do so only when 
the evidence is clear and convincing that the parent has 
either expressed an intention, or so conducted himself as 
to clearly indicate an intention to relinquish parental 
rights and reject parental responsibilities to his child. 
At 1112. 
-7-
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The facts of the Robertson case are analogous to Appellant's 
situation where, due to Respondent's failure to inform Appellant of 
his residences and his inaccessibility to Appellant, Appellant was 
unable to maintain continuous contact with her children. (R. 3. -
4., 11., 18., 25. - 26., 31., 40., 43.). 
S i mi 1 a r 1 y , i n Ha 11 v • Ander son , 5 6 2 P • 2 d 1 2 5 0 (Utah 19 7 7 ) , 
this Court upheld a decision of the lower court whereby a 
termination of parental rights was denied. In that case the father 
opposed adopt ion of his children by his former wife and her new 
spouse. He argued that he had not abandoned the children in that he 
had sent numerous letters to them, and had attempted to correspond 
with his ex-wife, but had gotten no response. Though he suffered a 
back injury and was out of work, the father sent some support money 
for the benefit of the children and sent gifts to the children. The 
Court held that though it is not necessary to show any affirmative 
declaration of abandonment of a child in order to uphold a 
t e rm i na t i on of par en ta 1 r i g h t s , " i t i s n eve r t he I e s s n e c es s a r y that 
it be shown that there was an intent, coupled with acts or conduct 
constituting a desertion or an abandonment." At 125. 
The Robertson and Hall cases, taken together, stand for the 
proposition that some act which evidences an intent to abandon 
children on the part of the parent is necessary to uphold a finding 
of abandonment. Further, these decisions show that in cases where, 
due to various exigencies, parents have failed to either meet 
-8-
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supp or t ob 1 i g a t i on s or to r e gu 1 a r 1 y c onmu n i ca t e w i t h ch i I d r en f r om 
whom they are separated, the Court will take such exigencies into 
account along with the presumption against termination of parental 
r i g h t s , and w i 11 p r e s er v e t hos e r i g h t s wh e r eve r po s s i b 1 e • I t i s 
these two principles which the lower court should have applied in 
Appellant's case. Had this been done, the contacts which Appellant 
initiated and continued with her ex-husband; her financial inability 
to pay support; her continued expressions of interest in and desire 
to see the children; the fact that she remained in close geographic 
proximity to the children; and the fact that she did on several 
occasions make the effort required to see and spend time with the 
children, despite her ex-husband's opposition, would have precluded 
termination of her rights as a parent, inasmuch as all of these 
factors demonstrate the absence of any conscious disregard for 
parental obligations on the part of Appellant. This evidence, 
however, was unfortunately and improperly not given proper weight by 
the Juvenile Court. 
Although it has been held that an order terminating 
par en ta 1 rights in a chi 1 d must be supported by a preponde ranee of 
the evidence, State v. In the Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 
(Utah 1976); State in the Interest of Walker B., 577 P.2d 119 (Utah 
19 7 8 ) ; St ate in the ln t ere st of E. and B. v . J. T. , 5 7 8 P. 2 d 8 31 
(Utah 1978), recent decisions more properly state that "the Court 
does not easily find •.. abandonment, but will do so only when the 
evidence is clear and convincing .•• " Robertson v. Hutchinson, 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). This standard was recently affirmed by 
the United States Supreme Court, which held that before a state may 
sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their 
natural chi Id, due process requires that the state support its 
allegations by at least the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (1982). There, an 
order terminating parental rights to a child was reversed because 
the trial court's finding of neglect was based on only a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
In the Juvenile Court's conclusions in Appellant's case, 
the trial court cites the case of State in the Interest of Sunmers 
Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977), as setting forth 
the standard for determining whether abandonment has occurred. In 
this case the Utah Supreme Court departed from the subjective 
examination of abandonment cases and stated: 
Whether or not there has been an abandonment within the 
meaning of the statute is to be determined objectively, 
taking into account not only the verbal expressions of the 
natural parents, but their conduct as parents as well. The 
s u b j e c t i v e i n t en t o f t en f o cu s e s t o o much at t en t i on on the 
parent's wishful thoughts and hopes ••. and too little on 
the more important element of how well the parents have 
discharged their parental responsibility. At 334. 
The Court went on to say, however, that: 
A better definition of abandonment . . • is that 
abandonment consists of conduct on the part of the parent 
which implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed 
by a parent to the child, leading to the destruction of the 
parent-child relationship. Id. 
In Appellant's case, the trial court failed to follow the dictates 
of the Sumners case. If t he q u e s t i on i s i n f a c t " how we 11 t he 
parents have discharged their parental responsibility", the facts 
-10-
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o f App e 1 1 an t ' s s i t u a t i on s h e d no u n favor ab 1 e 1 i g h t on he r 
conduct. It can hardly be said that she exhibited a "conscious 
disregard" for the children, since as she continually tried to 
contact them, remained in contact with their father as much as was 
possible, and did in fact see the children approximately five times 
i n t he t h r e e ye a r s f o 11 ow i n g he r d i v or c e . Because of her many 
at t emp t e d but i n f r e q u en t act u a 1 cont a c t s w i t h Mr • Jones , and her 
intermittent contacts with the children themselves, no "conscious 
disregard" for the children exists. The conclusion of the trial 
court that until James Robert Jones initiated the action to 
terminate Appellant's parental rights she showed little interest in 
the children is not supported by the facts, and the facts do not 
clearly and convincingly evidence conscious disregard for the 
children on Appellant's part. 
This Court has both a right and a duty to review the 
findings of the Juvenile Court upon appeal. As the Court stated in 
State in Interest of E. and B. v. J.T., 578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978), 
As hearings in the Juvenile Court are equitable in nature 
this Court has the responsibility to review both the facts 
and the law and to make its own findings and substitute 
its judgment for that of the lower court, if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings as made, or if 
the Court has abused its discretion. At 834. 
As the analysis above indicates, the Utah Courts have applied both 
the presumption against termination of parental rights and its 
power to review Juvenile Court findings to determine that a 
termination of parental rights cannot be upheld based upon an 
abandorunent theory in circumstances similar to those of 
Appellant. A careful reading of these cases supports the 
-11-
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conclusions that the parental rights of Appellant cannot be legally 
terminated based on an argument that she has "abandoned" her 
children. 
In the case of State in Interest of A., 30 Utah 2d 131, 
514 P.2d 797 (1973), this Court upheld the termination of a 
mother's parental rights. In that case the children had spent much 
of their lives away from their mother, and she had frequently lived 
significant distances from them. The Court specifically noted 
that, unlike the Appellant herein, the effort put forth by the 
mo t he r to v i s i t th e ch i 1 d r en i n that ca s e wa s " pr a c t i ca 11 y n i 1 " • 
Similarly, in Adoption of McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1981), the Supreme Court upheld an order of the Juvenile 
Court which terminated the rights of a father, thereby allowing the 
children's stepfather to adopt them. In that case, the parent 
failed to pay child support for a period of six years, despite his 
financial ability to do to. There the father moved away from where 
the children were living, and unlike the Appellant herein, did not 
attempt to learn of the whereabouts of the children through contact 
with knowledgeable parties. 
Clearly, both the A. case the McKinstray case can be 
distinguished from Appellant's situation. Appellant has maintained 
kn ow 1 edge of the ch i 1 d re n ' s whereabout s as much as was poss i b 1 e , 
has lived near to them, and has made several attempts to contact 
them which were thwarted by her former spouse. Appellant's failure 
to pay child support was for a much shorter period than that 
i n v 0 1 v e d i n Mc K i n s t r a y , and was due t o he r f i nan c i a 1 i nab i 1 i t y as 
opposed to mere unwi 11 i ngness to expend money to support the 
children. 
-12-
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POINT II 
A GUARDIAN AD LITEM SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPOINTED FOR AND ON 
BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN IN ADVANCE OF TERMINATION OF THEIR MOTHER'S 
PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
As previously stated, serious consideration must be given 
to the right of a child to be reared by his natural parents. In Re 
Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978) at 856. Unquestionably, the 
rights of the children were seriously affected in the trial court's 
termination of Appellant's parental rights, yet the children's 
interests were unrepresented despite the fact that the age of the 
children ranges from ten years to five years, and their last 
con tac t w i t h App e I 1 ant was a happy one . ( R . 2 8 . ) I n Utah , a 
guardian ad litem may be appointed in any cases "where it is deemed 
by the Court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted, 
expedient to represent the infant." U.R.C.P. 17(b). In 
Appellant's case, the feelings and desires of the children were 
explored neither on the record nor by informal consultation with 
the trial judge. Their particular interest was therefore given 
little weight, much less given serious consideration, prior to the 
Juvenile Court's order irrevocably severing their relationship with 
th e i r n a t u r a 1 mo the r • Such a d r a s t i c e f f e c t of the t e rm i n a t i on 
order on the rights of the children should have been made only 
after adequate assurance that the rights of the children were 
protected. 
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CONCLUSION 
A strong presumption against the termination of parental 
rights exists in the law. A finding in favor of termination of 
parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence 
indicative of conscious disregard of parental obligations by the 
party whose rights are terminated. In this case, the evidence did 
not support the findings of the trial Court, and the parental 
rights of Appellant should not have been terminated. , 
Under Utah 1 aw, a guardian ad 1 i tern may be appointed in 
any case where "it is deemed by the Court in which the action or 
proceeding is prosecuted, expedient to represent (the) infant." 
U.R.C.P. 17(b) The interest of the children of Appellant in 
preventing the termination of their rights to be reared by their 
natural parent should have been represented by a guardian ad 
litem. The trial Court abused its discretion by failing to appoint 
a guardian ad litem to act on behalf of the children, or otherwise 
giving serious consideration to the rights of the children. 
DATED this \~~ay of April, 1982. 
6\ AA ~~~.\ )J11- t144<M/}yV k.led"'~ 
WILLIAM G. SHELTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake 
211 East Third South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. 328-8849 
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Attorney for Respondents 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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